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The Spanish 2010 General State Budgets Act contained an important innovation consisting of the incorporation in the Spanish tax system of a new tax
incentive to maintain or create employment. The fact that this tax incentive is not applicable to permanent establishments (PE) raises the question of
whether it constitutes an infringement of the non-discrimination principle that limits the freedom of establishment. In general, the principle of non-
discrimination has had a significant impact on the Spanish tax system, mainly in relation to direct taxes and, in particular, on PE. The case we shall
now analyse is an example of this type of discrimination, which is prohibited both under the non-discrimination of PE clause envisaged in double taxation
treaties and pursuant to the Community freedom of establishment.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Spanish 2010 General State Budgets Act (Act 26/2009
of 23 December) contained an important innovation con-
sisting of the incorporation in the Spanish tax system of a
new tax incentive to maintain or create employment. This
measure mainly affects legal persons although a similar
incentive has also been envisaged for natural persons.
The Spanish Corporate Tax Act and Income Tax Act have
been amended to include this tax incentive to maintain or
create employment. The fact that this measure is applicable
exclusively to resident taxpayers creates certain doubts as to
its compatibility with the Community freedom of establish-
ment and tax treaty principle of non-discrimination of
permanent establishments (PE) of non-resident companies
operating in Spain. This paper describes the unequal tax
treatment given to PE of non-resident companies or indivi-
duals that operate in Spain since, although they are in the
same situation and carry out the same activities, they cannot
take advantage of this new tax incentive to create jobs that is
applicable only to resident taxpayers. In my opinion, in
order to avoid unjustifiable discriminatory tax treatment,
the Spanish legislator should extend this tax incentive to PE
that operate in Spain and create employment.
2. TAX INCENTIVE FOR RESIDENT ENTITIES
THAT CREATE EMPLOYMENT: A REDUCED
TAX RATE
Section 77 of Act 26/2009 adds the 12th Additional Provi-
sion to the Consolidated Version of the Corporate Tax Act
passed by Royal Decree 4/2004 of 5 March, under which a
reduced corporate tax rate is applied for maintaining or
creating employment. Specifically, a reduced tax rate is
envisaged for companies with a net turnover of less than
EUR 5 million and a mean number of employees of between
one and twenty-five, which maintain jobs, for tax years
starting on 1 January 2009. The essential requisite is that,
during the twelve months following the start of each tax
year, the mean number of employees of the company is not
less than one and not less than the mean number of employ-
ees during the twelve months prior to the start of the tax
year.
If these conditions are met, the incentive consists in the
application of a tax rate of 20% to the first EUR 120,202.41
of the tax base and a rate of 25% to the rest.1 The general
corporate tax rate in Spain is 30%. In addition, there is a
special tax system for small and medium-sized enterprises
under which such companies pay a progressive tax rate
starting at 25% on profits of up to EUR 120,202.41 and
30% on the rest of the tax base. Therefore, this tax conces-
sion consisting of a reduced tax rate of 20% and 25% is
undoubtedly of importance since it implies a significant
advantage for all companies resident in Spain, irrespective
of whether they pay the general tax rate or the special rate
for small and medium-sized enterprises.
PE of non-resident companies that operate in Spain are
taxed in accordance with the Non-Residents’ Income Tax
Act (NRITA) rather than the Corporate Tax Act. Since the
legislator has not envisaged this incentive in an analogous
rule of the NRITA, it may be held to be inapplicable to PE
that operate in Spain. Under the NRITA, PE are considered
equivalent to resident companies only for the purpose of
* Tax Law Professor, University of Alicante, Spain.
1 This measure is analysed in J. Aneiros Pereira, ‘El nuevo incentivo para el mantenimiento del Empleo: El Tipo De Gravamen Del 20 Por Ciento En El Impuesto Sobre Sociedades’,
Cro´nica Tributaria & Boletı´n de Actualidad, no. 1 (2010): 5–12.
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determining their tax base since only in this case is reference
made to the Corporate Tax Act.2 There is no similar refer-
ence to the Corporate Tax Act in relation to the tax rate
applicable to PE, which pay the tax rate envisaged in section
19 NRITA.3 Nevertheless, it should be remembered that
the 2nd Additional Provision of the NRITA envisaged a
progressive reduction in the tax rate, in line with the same
reduction in the corporate tax rate, from 2007 (32.5%) to
2008 and successive tax years (30%). However, there is no
such express provision regarding the new 2010 reduction in
the tax rate for maintaining or creating employment, which
is subsequent to that envisaged in the 2nd Additional
Provision NRITA and, in addition, more generous (20%
and 25%). We therefore consider that this reduction is not
applicable to PE of non-resident companies that operate in
Spain. An express provision in the NRITA would be neces-
sary4 in order to apply this reduction to PE, mainly of non-
resident companies but also of non-resident individuals.
The fact that this tax incentive is not applicable to PE
raises the question of whether it constitutes an infringement
of the non-discrimination principle that alters and limits
the freedom of establishment.5 In general, the principle of
non-discrimination has had a significant impact on the
Spanish tax system, mainly in relation to direct taxes, and
in particular on PE.6 The case we shall now analyse is, in our
opinion, an example of this type of discrimination, which is
prohibited both under the non-discrimination of PE clause
envisaged in double taxation treaties and pursuant to the
Community principle of non-discrimination.
3. DISCRIMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: CONSIDERATIONS IN THE LIGHT
OF ECJ CASE LAW CONCERNING
FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT
As is well known, based on freedom of establishment (Arti-
cle 49 Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, ex
Article 43 Treaty Establishing the European Community),
the situation of PE is similar to that of resident companies.
This means that companies have the right to set up
either a subsidiary or a PE without suffering any type of
discrimination based on the form chosen. The lack of legal
personality of PE, as opposed to resident subsidiaries, should
not be a reason for any differences in tax treatment.7
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law is quite
clear in this respect and analyses the effect of certain national
tax measures on freedom of establishment, taking as refer-
ence the comparable nature of the situation in which
resident and non-resident companies find themselves. Dis-
crimination is prohibited not only in identical situations
but also in comparable situations in which the reason for the
tax measure concerned is the same. Moreover, the Court has
held that a measure would be discriminatory and contravene
freedom of establishment when there is no sufficient justi-
fication for a difference in treatment. Broadly speaking, two
aspects should be examined in order to decide whether or
not the tax measure analysed is discriminatory: the compar-
ability of the situations and the existence of justification for
the difference in treatment.
In general, in this respect, it may be held that since the
Corporate Tax Act provisions are applied to PE when taxing
their profits, the comparability of resident companies and
PE is recognized. In other words, it may be objectively
deduced that there are no great differences between the
two since both are obliged to pay tax, in similar conditions,
on their profits, taking into consideration their worldwide
income, regardless of where it is obtained.8 The similarity
exists not only in relation to their tax base but also the
taxable event. This should logically mean that PE may
likewise take advantage of the same tax advantages or
incentives as do resident companies.9
Regarding the application of a reduced tax rate of 20%
and 25% in the cases envisaged, it should be agreed that the
comparison should be made between companies that main-
tain or create jobs and those that do not, regardless of
whether or not they reside in Spain. Bearing in mind the
origin and ultima ratio of this incentive, we consider that, for
the purpose of applying it, the comparability between com-
panies that are capable of maintaining or creating employ-
ment in certain conditions, rather than that between
resident and non-resident companies, should be considered.
From this point of view, it is obvious that both resident
companies and PE of non-resident companies may maintain
and create employment in order to foment production in
2 Section 18 Royal Legislative Decree 5/2004 of 5 Mar. passing the Consolidation Version of the Non-Residents’ Income Tax Act (NRITA): ‘The tax base of a permanent
establishment shall be determined pursuant to the general corporate tax regime’.
3 Section 19 NRITA: a tax rate of 35% shall be applied to the tax base determined in accordance with the previous section.
4 Either in this 2nd Additional Provision or in a specific provision of the Non-Residents’ Income Tax Act.
5 Some authors consider that this measure does not affect freedom of establishment based on the argument that lower tax rates exist in the European Union and similar measures in
other states (Aneiros, 6). In our opinion, the comparability that should be applied to analyse any restriction on the freedom of establishment imposed by this measure implies
comparing the permanent establishments (PE) in Spain with companies resident in Spain and not comparing resident companies in Spain with companies resident in other
Member States. In addition, the fact that other similar measures exist adopted by other states does not provide any element of analysis in relation to whether these measures are in
agreement with either double taxation treaties or the EU Treaty.
6 A. Garcı´a Prats, ‘The Potential Impact of the EC Non-discrimination Principle on Spanish Income Taxation’, EC Tax Review 3 (1998): 176–186.
7 Falco´n y Tella & Pulido Guerra, Derecho Fiscal Internacional (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009), 178.
8 Section 15.1 NRITA, ‘taxpayers who obtain income through a permanent establishment in Spain shall pay tax on all the income attributed to such establishment, irrespective of
the place where it is obtained’.




times of crisis and thus activate the economy. The effect on
employment would be the same, irrespective of the legal
form chosen to carry on the economic activity and the
residence of the company; hence, a tax incentive consisting
of reduced corporate tax rates should be applied to PE.
The idea that PE should not be discriminated against as
compared with resident companies abounds in the case law
of the ECJ.10 In all cases, the Court holds that if a company
that exercises its freedom of establishment is in a compar-
able situation to that of a company resident in the state
in which it operates through a PE, the tax rules of that
state should ensure that both companies (resident and
non-resident) are treated the same, which means that the
tax incentives envisaged for residents should be extended to
non-residents that are in a comparable situation.11
Undoubtedly, the judgment of the ECJ issued on 29 April
1999 in the Royal Bank of Scotland case is the one that best
illustrates the doctrine that could somehow be applied to
the measure analysed. In this judgment, the Greek rule
under which a higher tax rate was applied to branches of
foreign banks than that applied to resident companies was
analysed. The court held that a PE was in the same situation
as regards taxation of its profits as a Greek company and so
different tax treatment could not be applied. The tax rate
imposed on a PE should be the same as that levied on a
resident company provided that there were no objective
differences between the two.12 The key to the legal argu-
ments of the ECJ resides in the fact that although it is
generically possible to recognize certain differences between
residents and non-residents:
it is not sufficient simply to state that residents and non-
residents are in a different situation and may thus be
taxed differently. It is necessary in respect of each tax
advantage to determine whether there is a relevant
difference between them, such as to provide objective
justification for a specific difference in treatment.13
In view of this, we believe that the measure analysed may
be contrary to freedom of establishment since it is discrimi-
natory in comparable situations when the same tax treatment
should be given to PE and resident companies, both in respect
of the applicable tax rate and in application of tax credits and
benefits. In this respect, we share the opinion of those who
consider that application of the special regime under which
small companies with up to a certain turnover pay a reduced
rate of 25% when they are resident (including subsidiaries of
foreign companies) should be extended to PE of companies
resident in other Member States;14 otherwise, it would be
contrary to the Community freedom of establishment.
Given the difference in treatment, it should be evaluated
whether or not there is sufficient cause to justify tax rules
that are contrary to the freedom of establishment. Some of
these causes may be found in the ECJ case law. The ECJ has
held that some causes do not justify such measures, whereas
others do reasonably justify a difference in tax treatment.
The first include lack of harmonization of direct taxation,15
possible loss of or reduction in tax revenue,16 promotion of a
country’s economy based on investment in companies with
their headquarters therein,17 compensation of discrimina-
tory treatment with other possible advantages for the PE18
or the need to guarantee tax controls and prevent tax eva-
sion.19 None of these causes were considered sufficient to
justify a difference in treatment. On the other hand, the
need to have a territorial connection with the state that
provides the tax measure20 or the need to maintain coher-
ence of the tax system21 was considered sufficient to justify a
difference in treatment. In the case being analysed, none of
these causes could, in our opinion, justify not applying
reduced corporate tax rates to PE of non-resident companies
10 For example, the judgment of the ECJ issued on 28 Jan. 1986 in the Avoir fiscal case C-270/83, in which the court held that a measure that granted a deduction for corporate
double taxation only to resident companies that obtained dividends and not to PE of non-resident companies was contrary to freedom of establishment. Vid: among others;
judgments of the ECJ issued on 13 Jul. 1993 in the Commerzbank case C-330/91; 15 May 1997, Futura case C-250/95; 21 Sep. 1999, Saint Gobain case C-307/97; 14 Dec. 2000,
AMID case C-141/99; 23 Feb. 2006, CLT-UFA SA case C-253/03; 28 Feb. 2008, Deutsche Shell case C-293/06; 15 May 2008, Lidl case C-414/06; 23 Oct. 2008, Krankenheim case
C-157/07.
11 T. O’Shea, ‘Freedom of Establishment Tax Jurisprudence: Avoir Fiscal Re-visited’, EC Tax Review 6 (2008): 270.
12 The recent judgment of the ECJ issued on 6 Oct. 2009, Case C-562/07, European Commission v. Kingdom of Spain may be mentioned as an example of a pronouncement of the court
concerning discrimination in the application of tax rates. Although it was not a case concerning discrimination of PE, the Court gave judgment against Spain for having legislation
(until 1 Jan. 2007) under which capital gains of non-resident taxpayers were taxed at a rate of 35%, whereas in the case of residents, the applicable rate was 15% when the elements
of capital had been owned for more than a year and a progressive rate of 15% to 45% when owned for less than a year. The Court held that in this case and in a comparable
situation, non-residents were subject to, in certain cases, a higher tax burden than that born by residents, which was contrary to the free movement of capital. Moreover, the court
held that this difference in treatment was not justified by the need to preserve coherence of the tax system.
13 R. Lyal, ‘Non-discrimination and Direct Tax in Community Law’, EC Tax Review 2 (2003): 70.
14 Falco´n y Tella & Pulido Guerra, 178.
15 ECJ judgment of 28 of Jan., Avoir fiscal case; ECJ Judgment of 21 Sep. 1999, Saint Gobain case.
16 ECJ judgment of 21 Sep. 1999, Saint Gobain case.
17 ECJ judgment of 6 Jun. 2000, Verkoojen case C-35/98.
18 ECJ judgment of 28 Jan. 1986, Avoir fiscal case.
19 Although this last justification is possible, the ECJ has never applied it since the Court holds that the efficacy of tax controls cannot justify discriminatory measures and that
Community directives on mutual assistance and exchange of information make it possible to adequately guarantee cross-border tax control and reduce the risk of tax evasion.
20 The ECJ in its judgment issued on 15 May 1997 in the Futura case implicitly declared that the existence of a rule under which the compensation for losses sought by a non-
resident company with a branch in another state was conditional on such losses bearing an economic relationship with the income obtained by the taxpayer in that state was not
contrary to the principle of freedom of establishment.
21 ECJ judgment of 28 Jan. 1992, Bachmann case C-204/90 and Comisio´n/Be´lgica case C-300/90.
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that maintain or create employment in Spain in the terms
laid down in the relevant legislation.
4. NON-DISCRIMINATION OF PERMANENT
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN DTT
(ARTICLE 24.3 OECD MC)
This clause does not allow PE to be discriminated against in
matters of taxation of their business activities as compared
with resident companies in the same sector. The purpose of
this clause is to prevent contracting states from envisaging
tax measures that make resident companies more competi-
tive than non-resident companies operating in their terri-
tory through a PE.22 Comparability is considered to exist
when the companies involved fulfil similar subjective con-
ditions. Hence, the PE of corporations are compared with
corporations and those of partnerships with entities subject
to the income allocation regime.23 Under this article, less
favourable taxation than that applied to domestic companies
carrying on the same activities may not be imposed on a PE.
It does not prohibit a different tax system but rather the levy
of a more burdensome tax on PE than that levied on resident
companies. We believe that, in order to determine whether
less favourable taxation exists, the tax burden of the non-
resident company – which operates through a PE – in its
state of residence should not be taken into account. A
difference in treatment in procedural aspects would not be
discriminatory, nor even the levy of a different tax if it does
not imply less favourable taxation, and this should be
determined on a case-by-case basis. In the case considered,
since basically the corporate tax legislation is applied to
determine the tax base of the PE, not applying the reduced
tax rates for maintaining or creating employment to PE
would indeed mean less favourable taxation of the latter as
compared with resident companies. In some cases, it has been
understood that the unique nature of special tax regimes
does not allow certain tax advantages to be extended.
For example, Vogel considers that under Article 24.3
OECD Model Convention on Double Taxation, it is not
possible to extend tax incentives or special regimes enjoyed
by certain non-profit entities – foundations – and public
entities of the state in which the PE is located to the latter.24
One of the questions to be considered is how to define a
‘comparable situation’.25 It has been suggested that it
implies a similarity in each detail that may be considered
a relevant factor in a specific legal or factual situation. The
problem of interpretation arises again when determining
what factors should be considered relevant in a specific
situation26 and what is more important – should it be left
to the courts to decide the comparability case by case?27 A
comparable situation implies considering elements that are
‘substantially’ but not ‘formally’ the same. The primacy of a
substantial over a formal analysis is essential when deter-
mining whether or not there is discrimination.28 With
regard to the comparability in our case, it is evident that a
PE must carry on the same activities as the resident company
in order to avoid less favourable taxation. The PE must
belong to the same sector of economic activity or carry on
the same type of activities as a resident company. In the case
being analysed, the tax incentive is applied to all legal
persons that are corporate tax payers and does not refer to
any economic sector in particular or any specific activity.
Therefore, the PE that carries on any type of economic
activity in Spain would be in a comparable situation to that
of a company resident in Spain. Of course the legislator may
provide tax incentives or credits for certain economic sectors
(e.g., the automobile sector) or for certain activities (creation
of employment, RþDþi activities), and this is not contrary
to the non-discrimination clause in Article 24.3 OECD MC,
provided that the PE operating in the state is allowed access
to the same reductions in the same circumstances and con-
ditions. In the case considered, a reduced tax rate for any
type of company that creates employment should be
extended to PE that operate in Spain and create employ-
ment because the situation is comparable and, in this sense,
‘the same activities’ would be carried on as laid down in
Article 24.3 OECD MC. It does not seem logical that the
terms of comparison should refer exclusively to resident
companies that carry on domestic operations; they should
also include companies that carry on international opera-
tions and create employment in Spain.29
22 K. Van Raad, Non Discrimination in International Tax Law (Deventer: Kluwer, 1986), 127.
23 Nevertheless, there is a certain leeway regarding difference in treatment between PE and resident companies although this does not automatically imply application of a different
legal system. Art. 24.3 OECD MC attempts to solve the problem and prevent such discrimination (F. Serrano Anto´n, ‘La tributacio´n de los no residentes mediante establecimiento
permanente’, en Internacionalizacio´n de las inversiones, dir: Collado Yurrita (Bosch: Luchena Mozo y Sa´nchez Lo´pez, 2009), 668).
24 K. Vogel, Double Taxation Conventions (Boston: Kluwer, 1997), Art. 24, para. 124.
25 For A.P. Dourado, ‘From the Saint Gobain to the Metallgesellschaft Case: Scope of Non-Discrimination of Permanent Establishments in the EC Treaty and the Most-Favoured-
Nation Clause in EC Member States Tax Treaties’, EC Tax Review 3 (2002): 148, ‘the meaning itself of equal treatment of permanent establishments in relation to subsidiaries is
not unambiguous in international tax law’.
26 In the opinion of C. Peters & M. Snellaars, ‘Non-discrimination and Tax Law: Structure and Comparison of the Various Non-Discrimination Clauses’, EC Tax Review 1 (2001): 14,
it is the purposes and objectives of the specific potentially discriminatory tax rule that will determine whether or not a certain circumstance or activity is discriminatory.
27 B. Santiago, ‘Non Discrimination Provisions at the Intersection of EC and International Tax Law’, European Taxation 5 (2009): 254. This author proposes considering ‘a
hypothetical situation that has the similarities required by the provision in question with the real situation’, to be a similar situation 262.
28 Dourado, 152.
29 Caldero´n et al., Comentarios a Los Convenios Para Evitar La Doble Imposicio´n Y Prevenir La Evasio´n Fiscal Concluidos Por Espan˜a (Fundacio´n Pedro Barrie´ de la Maza: Instituto Estudios




The Committee on Fiscal Affairs refers to tax incentives
that the states adopt to solve specific problems, such as
decentralization of industry, development of more econom-
ically backward regions, or promotion of new activities
necessary to expand the economy.30 All these incentives,
in the opinion of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, should
be extended to the PE of companies resident in another
state if there is a double taxation treaty that includes the
non-discrimination clause envisaged in Article 24 OECD
MC and this PE is authorized to carry on its activities in the
state in question. Therefore, the PE should be allowed to
enjoy such tax incentives provided that it fulfils the con-
ditions laid down in the relevant legislation in the same
terms as do resident companies. Nevertheless, it is obvious
that the principle of non-discrimination does not make it
compulsory to extend to the PE of non-resident companies
tax incentives that are strictly reserved for certain compa-
nies due to national interest, defence, protection of the
domestic economy, and so forth, since the PE of foreign
companies would not be authorized to carry on such
activities.31
From the OECD MC, it may be deduced that the struc-
ture and type of tax rate applicable to resident companies
should be applied to PE pursuant to Article 24.3 OECD
MC. Some doubts may arise as to the types of specific or
special tax rates applicable to certain resident companies and
not to a PE. The difficulties may reside in the fact that the
PE is only a part of a legal person that is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the state in which the PE is located. Never-
theless, it is understood that if the PE carries on the same
activities as the resident companies to whom a specific tax
rate is applied, then the same tax rate should be extended to
the PE.32
The Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD has
declared that the rules providing a progressive tax rate for
resident companies are applicable to PE based in that state,
and for this purpose, the profits obtained by the company of
which the PE forms part are taken into account, and this is
not contrary to Article 24.3 OECD MC.33
In any case, the hybrid nature of PE makes it difficult to
apply the non-discrimination principle. In the case of appli-
cation of progressive tax rates, under the Double Tax Treaty
(DTT) between Spain and Belgium, a PE may be taxed at
the maximum rate envisaged for resident companies and
this poses no problems with the non-discrimination princi-
ple. On the other hand, the DTT with India provides that it
is not contrary to the non-discrimination principle to tax a
PE at a higher rate than that applicable to a resident
company.
Most of the Spanish DTT contain this non-discrimination
of PE clause and, in general, follow the precept of the OECD
MC. Only the DTT with India provides, for the purpose of
non-discrimination, that a PE of a contracting state shall be
compared, not with companies resident in the state where the
PE is located but with other PE of companies resident in a
third state, thereby configuring a kind of ‘most favoured
permanent establishment’ clause.
The Spanish authorities have interpreted non-
discrimination of PE in relation to application of the Span-
ish tax system for joint ventures to PE based in Spain. The
authorities consider that verification of the existence of less
favourable taxation should be analysed case by case and that
it is not contrary to Article 24.3 OECD MC to give different
tax treatment to non-residents and residents. In this specific
case, the authorities understand that since it is not possible
to compensate the losses generated by the branch with the
profits of the joint venture, it is difficult to compensate
profits and losses in the joint venture in which it partici-
pates. This results in less favourable taxation than that
which would arise from participation in the joint venture
of entities resident in Spain and so produces discrimination
prohibited under the DTT.34 In cases in which it is not
possible to verify that a more burdensome taxation is actu-
ally imposed on the PE, application of rules to the PE that
are different to those applied to resident companies does not
constitute discrimination prohibited under tax treaties.35
The Spanish Supreme Court held – mistakenly in the
opinion of Spanish authors, with whom we agree – that the
Spanish rule that prevented a PE from acting as the domi-
nant company in a tax consolidated group was not discri-
minatory. The only argument of the Supreme Court, which
is debatable, was that under Spanish rules, only public
limited companies resident in Spain may avail themselves
of the tax consolidation regime.36 Nevertheless, we believe
that it is obviously more burdensome for a PE to be pre-
vented from heading a consolidated group in Spain than to
be allowed to head such a group since in the latter case, it
would be possible to compensate losses between members of
the group, which would reduce the tax burden. The
Supreme Court compares the PE of a non-resident company
with other Spanish establishments lacking legal personality
and argues that tax treatment in relation to tax consolida-
tion is the same in these two cases since it is not comparable
with the treatment given to companies in Spain. The Court
30 Paragraph 43 of the Comments on Art. 24 OECD MC.
31 Paragraph 46 of the Comments on Art. 24 OECD MC.
32 Caldero´n et al., 1129.
33 Paragraph 57 of the Comments on Art. 24.3OECD MC.
34 Enquiries to the Directorate General for Taxation (DGT) 23/2005 of 28 January (DTT Spain-France) and 25/2005 of 29 January (DTT Spain/Belgium).
35 DGT enquiries 635/2002 of 26 April (DTT Spain-Denmark) and Binding Enquiry V1089/2005 of 14 Jun. 2005 (DTT Spain-Italy).
36 Judgments of the Supreme Court issued on 15 Jul. 2002 and 12 Feb. 2003.
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makes the mistake of comparing a PE with other entities
lacking legal personality in Spain, when under Article 24.3
OECD MC, a PE should receive the same treatment as that
given to Spanish companies that carry on the same activities.
This has been clearly interpreted by experts and shows the
mistake made by the Court as regards the objects of com-
parison in the principle of non-discrimination.37 For this
reason, as well as in view of the ECJ case law, the Spanish
legislator modified the Corporate Tax Act rule and now
authorizes a PE to act as the dominant company in a tax-
consolidated group in Spain.
Given the existence of two interpretations of non-
discrimination, that is, Article 24 of Tax Treaties and EC
law, the question has arisen as to whether double taxation
treaties between Member States should be interpreted
following the ECJ case law or whether they are two differ-
ent frameworks that may coexist. In this sense, we share
the opinion that although it is not necessary to harmonize
the non-discrimination provisions in the tax treaties and
EC law because the two have different objectives and
different sources of interpretation and, moreover, there is
no real conflict between the two sets of rules, the truth is
that this does not mean that the interpretation of the ECJ
should not be taken into account when interpreting the
non-discrimination provisions of a double taxation treaty.
Quite the opposite, it is advisable to be aware of and take
into consideration the interpretation of the ECJ in such
cases.38
In this respect, the Luxembourg Court has demonstrated
the divergence of interpretations of the non-discrimination
of PE clause, with the result that, on some occasions, its
interpretation is insufficient to satisfy the demands of free-
dom of establishment – see the judgment in the Wielockx
case, in favour of a PE (natural person), concerning non-
recognition of the deductibility of certain contributions
made. In other cases, the ECJ held that even in application
of the same rules – the requisite of separate accounting for
the PE under the legislation applicable to resident compa-
nies, for the purpose of demonstrating the existence of losses
so as to be able to compensate for such losses – there is a
restriction on the freedom of establishment given that this
requisite implies an additional financial burden for non-
resident companies with a PE since they must draw up their
accounts pursuant to two different legislations – Futura
judgment.39
5. TAX INCENTIVE FOR RESIDENT NATURAL
PERSONS WHO CREATE EMPLOYMENT:
TAX BASE REDUCTION
The incentive to maintain or create employment for natural
persons resident in Spain consists in applying a 20% reduc-
tion in income tax on the net income from economic activ-
ities.40 In order to apply this reduction, a natural person
must exercise a self-employed economic activity, have a
turnover of less than EUR 5 million, have a mean number
of employees of less than twenty-five, and, moreover, main-
tain or create employment. Once again, this measure is
applicable exclusively to resident natural persons who carry
on self-employed economic activities and, therefore, is not
applicable to the PE of non-resident natural persons given
that the tax base of a PE based in Spain is always determined
pursuant to corporate tax rules.41 These rules do not envi-
sage any reduction in the tax base but simply a type of
reduced tax, as seen above, that is not applicable to PE.
Therefore, since the PE of non-resident natural persons
determine their tax base pursuant to corporate tax rules,
they cannot take advantage of a 20% reduction in their tax
base because the income tax legislation is not applicable
when determining the tax base of non-resident natural
persons who operate through a PE.
With regard to this question, it should be remembered
that the second phrase of Article 24.3 OECD MC limits
positive discrimination by indicating that natural persons
who operate through a PE shall not take advantage of
personal or family tax credits or deductions granted to
residents since the state of residence and not the state in
which the PE is located should adapt such circumstances to
the taxpayer’s ability to pay, thereby preventing a double
benefit from being obtained in the two states. The provision
attempts to ensure that natural persons who operate through
a PE in another state do not obtain greater advantages than
do the residents in this other state by applying personal and
family deductions twice, once in the state of residence of the
natural person – in application of domestic rules, and again
in the state in which the PE operates – in application of the
principle of non-discrimination in tax matters.42 However,
the tax treaties signed by Spain with Morocco and Switzer-
land allow the opposite and ensure that the nationals of a
state subject to taxation in the other state may take advan-
tage in the latter of the tax benefits and exemptions granted
37 A. Garcı´a Heredia, ‘La discriminacio´n de establecimientos permanentes de sociedades de otros Estados miembros. A propo´sito de la STS de 12 de febrero de 2003’, en Aranzadi
Jurisprudencia tributaria 10 (2003): 33–49.
38 B. Garrido, ‘Interaction between the Interpretation of the Non-Discrimination Provisions in Tax Treaties and in the EC Treaty: An Apparent Rather than Real conflict’, EC Tax
Review 4 (2009): 178. In this sense, in Ph. Hinnekens, ‘Non-Discrimination Art. in OECD Model Convention Needs Fundamental Review’, EC Tax Review 6 (2008): 249,
considers that ECJ case law should be a source of inspiration to propose a new legal framework for the new non-discrimination article of the OECD Model Convention, even
though tax treaties and EC law pursue different objectives because they understand that the interpretation of the ECJ has contributed to the successful, uniform development of
this principle of non-discrimination in EC law.
39 A. Garcı´a Prats, ‘La cla´usula de no discriminacio´n en los Convenios para evitar la doble imposicio´n internacional’, Fiscalidad Internacional, 3a edicio´n (Madrid: CEF, 2010), 1090.
40 Section 72 of the General State Budgets 2010 Act (Act 26/2009 of 23 December) includes a 27th Additional Provision to the Natural Persons Income Tax Act (Act 35/2006 of 28
November).
41 Section 18 NRITA.




for families in the same conditions as nationals of the first
state. In any case, application of a reduction in the tax base
for natural persons who maintain or create employment does
not appear to be considered a personal or family incentive;
thus, under Article 24.3 OECD MC, this business incentive
would be applicable to PE of non-resident natural persons.
On the other hand, it should be noted that natural
persons resident in a Member State of the European Union
who own a PE and obtain more than 75% of their income in
Spain may apply section 46 of the NRITA43 and opt for
paying tax in Spain as though they were residents applying
the natural persons’ income tax rules. In such a case, the
20% reduction in tax on the net income from economic
activities for maintaining or creating employment would be
applicable, taking into account the legislation envisaged for
residents. Otherwise, that is, if it were not possible to
exercise the option envisaged in section 46 NRITA and
for other individuals resident in a third state that operate
through a PE, discrimination in the terms analysed would
persist since it would not be possible to apply the 20%
reduction in the tax base of PE that create or maintain
employment.
43 Section 46 NRITA, ‘A taxpayer who is a natural person resident in a Member State of the European Union, provided that he proves he has fixed his habitual residence or domicile
in a Member State of the European Union, and has obtained in Spain during the tax year at least 75% of all income from earnings and economic activities, may opt for paying
natural persons’ income tax provided that during this period non-residents’ income tax has effectively been levied on such income’.
Note
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